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Zohrab v Attorney-General & Others

© Peter Zohrab 2010

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This was a case against several parties, including branches of the New Zealand Government and United Nations, four media outlets, and other parties who propagandised for the anti-male White Ribbon Campaign.  Basically, the case alleged anti-male sexism, which expressed iself as discrimination or defamation. 

I represented myself in person.  I have a Law degree and I have passed my legal professional examinations, but I have no relevant work experience in the Law.  Consequently, when a judge in a preliminary hearing said that my statement of claim was not even vaguely like a proper statement of claim, and warned me of substantial costs that I would incur if I proceeded without professional legal help, I called the whole thing off.  (I have subsequently come to the conclusion that the main problem was probably that I had read that I was supposed to avoid repetition, and so I put some explanatory remarks about the White Ribbon Campaign at the start -- so as not to have to repeat it for each Respondent.  That was probably not the way to do it.)

I doubted that there was any lawyer who could/would do justice to this statement of claim -- more especially not a lawyer who works under the Legal Aid system, which provides inadequate remuneration and does not attract right-wing lawyers, who are concentrated in the commercial law area.  In my experience, lawyers (especially Leftist lawyers) generally have absolutely no concept of men having rights and tend to demand changes to statements of claim involving men's rights which undermine and castrate the claim.

 

Timeline

  1. On 23 November 2009, I filed the papers which initiated the court case -- i.e. the Notice of Proceeding and the Statement of Claim -- at the Wellington High Court.  The legal issues were defamation and discrimination.  There were sixteen defendants.

  2. There followed some procedural matters, in which I initially followed the advice of High Court office staff.  This advice turned out to be wrong, according to a High Court Judge.  He (in the second hearing mentioned below) simply ignored my statement that High Court staff were responsible for my adopting a certain procedure, which he criticised.

  3. The initial procedural matter involved my trying to serve the above papers on the three overseas parties in a way that did not involve me in great expense, which I could not afford.  On 27 November 2009, I filed papers on this procedural matter.

  4. A hearing was held on this procedural matter before a High Court Judge, who decided to reschedule the hearing for a later date, on the grounds that no other parties were represented at the hearing, and that he thought that counsel for the Crown (i.e. the Crown Law Office) would want to have an input, and probably needed more time to prepare.

  5. The Crown Law Office filed an application, on behalf of four of the defendants (which were branches of Government), to strike out my statement of claim. 

  6. Counsel for four other defendants (the media defendants) filed a memorandum foreshadowing their own intention to apply to strike out my claim.

  7. On 9 December 2009, the second (and, as it turned out) final hearing was held before Justice Ronald Young.

  8. My procedural application was put on hold, pending a resolution of the applications to strike out my substantive claim, for which the Judge drew up a timetable.

  9. That same day, the Judge issued a Minute about the hearing which had taken place.  What was (to me) the most mysterious part of his Minute was his statement that the statement of claim had failed "to comply with basic pleading rules."  That was the basic reason that I withdrew my action (see below).  Verbally, at the hearing, the Judge had stated that all my statement of claim contained was statements of my beliefs.  If that is what he meant by failing to comply with basic pleading rules, then he was clearly wrong, as far as I can see.  However, I am too inexperienced to be certain of that.  I did start the statement of claim with some general statements about the White Ribbon Campaign, because it was involved in my case against several of the defendants, and the High Court Rules require statements of claim to avoid repetition.  However, the bulk of my statement of claim makes quite precise and focussed allegations.

  10. Crown Law had made some invalid arguments, such as that the Crown could not be injuncted (case law has affected the interpretation of statute on this point) and that my statement of claim was prolix (when account is taken of the number of causes of action and the number of defendants, this claim could not hold water).

  11. I had failed to comply with some technical requirements of the Defamation Act, but these could have been corrected later.

  12. Although I did not take notes at the time, since I was standing up, I think the Judge also said that I was trying to take Parliament to court over some of its Acts, which is legally impossible, because Parliament is sovereign and above the Law.  However, that was not my intention.  My intention, at least, was to take the Executive to court for actions leading up to the passing of legislation by Parliament.  Cabinet (unlike the Executive Council) is not a legally constituted entity, so I took my case against the Attorney-General. First, as part to the policy-formulation process, Cabinet's Social Policy Committee gets a Gender Implications Statement, which is biased in favour of women.  Secondly, the Crown Law Office and Ministry of Justice have the job of advising the Attorney-General on the consistency of draft Bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  This advice, prior to my court case, had been consistently biased in favour of women. 

  13. I had never, in my legal training, been taught the concept of a "legal person", so I targetted my claim wrongly, with respect to some defendants. This could also have been corrected later.

  14. The Judge stated that the United Nations (some of the defendants were UN employees or agencies) was immune to legal action, which was an issue that I didn't feel competent to deal with.  If I knew the relevant case law, I would be in a position to see whether that was an absolute, or whether there were grey areas.  I could later have amended the statement of claim, omitting these defendants.

  15. The Judge did not think my Defamation claim would succeed, if I was relying all my being a man and the defamation being a defamation against all men.  I doubt that there is any case law to that effect.  I do know that a defamation claim may succeed when brought by a member of a group that is defamed (Lord Atkin in Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (HL)).

  16. The Hearing was in Chambers, and there was a "No Public Admittance" notice outside the door.  A female reporter from one of the media defendants' publications entered and requested permission to stay.  I argued against her being present, stating that it was discriminatory to bar the public but allow in the media -- especially as it was one of the defendants -- but the Judge ruled in her favour, denying that the public were barred.  That was a blatant lie on his part.  The public is usually barred from hearings in Chambers.  It was clear that he and the journalist were on friendly terms.  When I left the room after the hearing, she tried to interview me, but I just kept going.  My issue with the media is not that they don't interview me from time to time when I do something newsworthy -- my issue is that they treat Feminists such as Women's Refuge as experts (for no good reason), and call on them (but not Masculists such as myself) to comment when someone else does something newsworthy.

  17. On 15 December 2009, I called off my court action and paid the costs incurred up to that point by the other parties.

 

 

CONTENTS OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM

 

A) Introduction and Standing

 

B)White Ribbon Campaign

 

C) Defamation in General

 

Domestic Violence

Kapiti Coast District Council

Legal Profession

National Network of Stopping Violence Services

Television New Zealand Ltd.

Education

Kapiti News

Ministry of Health

New Zealand Police

United Nations Development Fund for Women

Families Commission

Kapiti Observer

Ministry of Justice

Paraparaumu Medical Centre

United Nations Secretary-General

Human Rights Commission

Dominion Post

Ministry of Social Development

Rape

Women's Refuge

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D) Discrimination in General

Cabinet Office

Domestic Violence

Human Rights Commission

Ministry of Health

New Zealand Police

Right to Vote and Military Service

Television New Zealand Ltd.

Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E) CONCLUSION

 

 

Statement of Claim

In the High Court of New Zealand      No: CIV-2009-485-2372

Wellington Registry

 

Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the Defamation Act 1992

 

Between PETER DOUGLAS ZOHRAB ...

(plaintiff)

 

And

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, C/- Solicitor-General, Crown Law Office, Level 10, UNISYS House, 56 The Terrace, Wellington

(first defendant)


And

THE FAMILIES COMMISSION, Public Trust Building, Level 6, 117-125 Lambton Quay, Wellington 6140

(second defendant)


And

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Level 1, Vector Building, 44-52 The Terrace, Wellington

(third defendant)


And

THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL STUDIES, C/- Ministry of Justice, L 3, Vogel Building, 8 Aitken Street, Wellington

(fourth defendant)


And

THE KAPITI COAST DISTRICT COUNCIL, Rimu Road, Paraparaumu

(fifth defendant)


And

APN NEW ZEALAND LTD, C/- Kapiti News, Rimu Road, Paraparaumu

(sixth defendant)


And

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD, C/- Sarah Margaret Hard, Level 3, 40 Boulcott Street, Wellington

(seventh defendant)


And

VICTORY SUPERMARKETS LIMITED, C/- Pak N Save Paraparaumu, Rimu Road, Paraparaumu

(eighth defendant)


And

THE PARAPARAUMU MEDICAL CENTRE, 92-94 Kapiti Road, Paraparaumu

(ninth defendant)


And

RADIO NEW ZEALAND, 155 The Terrace, Wellington

(tenth defendant)


And

TELEVISION NEW ZEALAND LIMITED, 86-90 Lambton Quay, Wellington

(eleventh defendant)


And

THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN, 304 East 45th Street, 15th Floor, New York, NY 10017, USA

(twelfth defendant)


And

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UN Headquarters, First Avenue at 46th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA

(thirteenth defendant)


And

THE WHITE RIBBON CAMPAIGN, 365 Bloor St. East, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4W 3L4

(fourteenth defendant)


And

THE NATIONAL COLLECTIVE OF INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S REFUGES, INCORPORATED, 3rd Floor, Cmc Building, 89 Courtenay Place, Wellington
(fifteenth defendant)


And

TE KUPENGA WHAKAOTI MAHI PATUNGA THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF STOPPING VIOLENCE SERVICES (N Z) INCORPORATED, Level 6, Outwide House, 61-63 Taranaki Street, Wellington

(sixteenth defendant)

____________________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF CLAIM
____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

Peter Zohrab
(details deleted)
Email: peter@zohrab.name

 

Introduction and Standing

 

1. The plaintiff says that he is making this claim on his own behalf as a Men's Rights activist of long standing, as a New Zealand male resident and citizen and also on behalf of all the males of New Zealand.
2. Where the plaintiff makes reference to men, he intends that reference to include boys, where that is appropriate.
3. Where the plaintiff makes reference to women, he intends that reference to include girls, where that is appropriate.
4. The plaintiff has been a Men's Rights activist in New Zealand, and a member of a loose coalition of Men's and Fathers' Rights activists in New Zealand, since approximately 1987.
5. The plaintiff has long been one of the main proponents of Men's Rights in New Zealand, if Men's Rights are taken to include Fathers' Rights, amongst other issues.
6. For several years, the plaintiff has, in turn, been the main force behind three small Men's Rights organisations, which have, in effect, been the same organisation under different names.
7. In recent years the third of these organisations, the New Zealnd Equality Education Foundation, has not been recruiting members, but has been merely a mouthpiece for the plaintiff, who has been acting as a one-man "organisation".
8. The plaintiff has been told that many men support his activism but are afraid to do this openly.
9. The plaintiff has also been told that "Men don't join this sort of organisation." If that is true, then it would constitute indirect discrimination against men for standing to be denied him in this action on the grounds that the plaintiff is an individual, rather than an organisation.
10. The plaintiff submits that it is true that men are reluctant to join such organisations, because the first defendant, together with the media and the education system, has been directly and indirectly promoting the notion that only women have rights which are in need of promoting and has been directly and indirectly suppressing the dissemination of contrary views.
11. This has created a climate in which most men do not perceive a need or a justification for them to join a Men's Rights organisation.
12. There is no Ministry of Men's Affairs and there are no large New Zealand men's groups to represent the broader interests of men.
13. There are some Fathers' groups, but they tend to have a narrow focus on issues which they see as being relevant to separation and divorce.
14. On the other hand, there is a Ministry of Women's Affairs ("MWA"), and there is an overhelming number of women's organisations – all of which represent, to a greater or lesser extent, what they see as the interests of women, which tend to conflict with the interests of men.
15. For these reasons, the plaintiff asserts his right to represent all the men of New Zealand in this action, as well as himself, as a man and as a Men's Rights activist.
16. The Defendants have been directly and indirectly either defaming men or discriminating against men.
17. Some of the Defendants have been directly and indirectly both defaming men and discriminating against men.
18. This defamation of men results in a set of beliefs having become common in the population which provides the rationale for discrimination against men.
19. This discrimination against men includes discrimination against men in ways which limit their capacity to counter this defamation and discrimination.
20. So the defamation and discrimination reinforce each other and thereby comprise an anti-male ideological system.
21. The defamation of men to men results in male self-hatred and the willing subordination of men to women in certain important respects.
22. This subordination expresses itself as an unwillingness to criticise women and also as a habitually critical attitude towards men.
23. This attitude, which has been fostered by the first defendant, discriminates against the plaintiff, in his capacity as a Men's Rights activist.
24. This attitude impinges on his day-to-day life, subjecting him to hostility from ill-informed, totalitarian people, who do not believe in the right of people to hold and express views which are diametrically opposed to those inculcated by the Defendants.
25. The first defendant has, in effect, adopted an ideology, which can reasonably be referred to as Feminism, and has been led thereby to breach some of its legal duties towards its male subjects.
26. The first defendant has done this covertly, rather than explicitly stating the nature of the ideology and allowing it to be scrutinised for consistency and fairness.
27. This adherence to an ideology has been irrational. By this the plaintiff means that inconsistent evidence, on the whole, has not been searched for, and has, on the whole, been disregarded when encountered.
28. This has happened because the Feminist notion that women – but not men -- are disadvantaged has been a fundamental ideological assumption of Feminism, and this assumption has proscribed the search for, and consideration of, inconsistent evidence.
29. No systematic inquiry in a format conforming with the principles of natural justice has ever been carried out anywhere in the World to establish that women suffer more discrimination than men do.
30. There is substantial overlap between the first defendant's activities which constitute defamation and those which constitute discrimination.
31. The first defendant comprises many agencies, and the plaintiff will outline the breaches of the law committed by each relevant agency.
32. The first defendant has also represented and supported discriminatory activist stances and propaganda diametrically opposed to those of Masculists (Men's Rights Activists) such as the plaintiff.
33. The first defendant has aggressively promoted women's interests at the expense of men's interests.
34. The first defendant have applied different standards to different issues, according to where the best interests of women were seen to lie at the time.
35. The plaintiff has confused promoting the rights of the disadvantaged in "good faith" with following an ideology in blind belief and a refusal to consider the case for and against in a dispassionate manner.
36. Feminist doctrines have been used by the first defendant to justify policies and legislation which have been detrimental to the rights and interests of the first defendant's male citizens.
37. This doctrine has also been used to block attempts by activists such as the plaintiff to counter this indoctrination and the policies and legislation which have resulted from it.
38. Most Feminists believe that women are inevitably discriminated against, so that discrimination against men is impossible, or insignificant.
39. Many Feminists fear that allowing men to be viewed as discriminated against will undermine the Feminists' political power to maintain and improve the position of women vis-a-vis men in society.
40. To the extent that the first defendant has cooperated with Feminists, it has oppressed men.
41. Meanwhile, the first defendant has allowed women to have the vote, while allowing the suffering, trauma and death of World Wars to be a burden imposed solely on men by conscription.
42. The first defendant has preached equality out of one side of its mouth, while preaching female privilege in conscription, government policies involving the Ministry of Women's Affairs, health, sports double standards and police employment double standards out of the other side of its mouth.
43. This background Feminist stereotype is a mindset which produces a reaction of greater or lesser incredulity when presented with Men's Rights arguments, which handicaps the Men's Movement's attempts to make progress on specific issues.
44. The first defendant has a responsibility to make Democracy a reality in New Zealand, by providing a level playing-field for various competing points of view.
45. The number of women's organisation in New Zealand is vastly greater than the number of men's organisations, and this has an effect on the extent to which women's rights and interests receive more publicity than do men's rights and interests.
46. The plaintiff does not hold the first defendant responsible for that state of affairs directly.
47. However, the first defendant has a duty to allow men access to information which might make them want to form or to join men's organisations – just as the information provided by Feminist sources fostered by the first defendant has made women feel the need to form and to join so many women's organisations.
48. The first defendant also has a duty to ensure that there is no bias against men in the allocation of funding and other resources to men's organisations.
49. The first defendant has an obligation to ensure that powerful institutions such as the mass media, the education sector, the trade unions and the public service are not misused and abused in order to carry out political agendas which are not part of the reason for their existence (i.e. non-employment-related matters) – including Feminist agendas.
50. The plaintiff will also outline breaches of the law by non-governmental agencies, where these agencies have been given special status by the fact that 1 or more government agencies privileges them and recommends them to the public at large or invites them to participate in the policy-making or policy implementation process.
51. The plaintiff submits that giving such agencies special status constitutes breaching the law by pr0ksy.

 

 

WHITE RIBBON CAMPAIGN

52. The White Ribbon Campaign ("WRC") is an international campaign which was founded in Canada.
53. The webpage http://www.whiteribbon.ca/about_us/ (last accessed on 7 October 2009) of the website of the Canadian branch of the campaign contains the following passage:

" What is the White Ribbon Campaign (WRC)?
The White Ribbon Campaign (WRC) is the largest effort in the world of men working to end violence against women (VAW). In over fifty-five countries, campaigns are led by both men and women, even though the focus is on educating men and boys. In some countries it is a general public education effort focused on ending violence against women."

54. The same webpage http://www.whiteribbon.ca/about_us/ (last accessed on 7 October 2009) also contains the following passage:

' What about other forms of violence?
Although ending men’s violence against women is our focus, we are concerned about all forms of violence. We are deeply concerned about violence against children. We are concerned about violence among boys on the playground, in the sports arena, in relationships, and in war. And we are concerned by acts of violence by women against women or against men, although these are not as extensive nor as frequently lethal as men’s violence against women.
Unlike violence by some women against men, violence committed by some men against women has long been socially acceptable and is deeply rooted in beliefs of men’s superiority and of men’s right to control the lives of “their” women.'

55. The passage headed " What is the White Ribbon Campaign (WRC)?" correctly characterises the White Ribbon Campaign as a campaign which combats violence against women.
56. More precisely, however, it is also clear, as the passage headed "What about other forms of violence?" points out, that the WRC combats violence by men against women, rather than equally targetting violence against women that is perpetrated by either women or men.
57. The plaintiff submits that this campaign defames men in every place where its posters, webpages and other campaign material are published, including places in New Zealand.
58. The plaintiff also submits that this campaign discriminates against men in every place where its posters, webpages and other campaign material are published, including New Zealand, although this discrimination is illegal in a somewhat different set of circumstances than is the defamation.
59. The WRC's campaign material clearly focuses on male violence towards women and (except in small print on background, FAQ-type pages such as http://www.whiteribbon.ca/about_us/ ) does not even mention other types of violence.
60. The WRC's campaign material disseminates the Feminist message that female violence towards males is either nonexistent or is less frequent or less serious than female violence towards males.
61. It is not true that female violence towards males is either nonexistent or is less frequent or significantly less serious than female violence towards males.
62. This is the overwhelming conclusion which emerges from the scientific literature on the subject.
63. To the extent that male violence towards females is more serious than female violence towards males – and this is only true if homicides are included in the total – that is the result of Feminist hate campaigns such as the WRC, which have had the political result of preventing men from being offered any help by the Crown or the voluntary sector in the face of female violence.
64. Feminist campaigns such as the WRC have ensured that publicity and resources have focused almost solely on male violence against women, which throws men back onto their own resources, which include the possibility of violent retaliation.
65. Even the background, FAQ-type page http://www.whiteribbon.ca/about_us/ defames men by stating that "(acts of violence by women against women or against men) are not as extensive nor as frequently lethal as men’s violence against women."
66. In addition, the page http://www.whiteribbon.ca/about_us/ defames men by repeating the Feminist hate-propaganda stereotype that 'violence committed by some men against women has long been socially acceptable and is deeply rooted in beliefs of men’s superiority and of men’s right to control the lives of “their” women.'
67. Whatever may or may not be or have been the case in other places or at other times, which is difficult to establish, in present-day Western societies it is women's violence against men which is socially acceptable. This has come about, in part, because of defamatory and discriminatory Feminist campaigns such as the WRC.
68. In present-day Western societies it is an empirical matter whether women have more control over "their" men than men have over "their" women, and I am not aware that any empirical study of this issue has ever been undertaken.
69. In present-day Western societies it is not difficult to find evidence of beliefs of women's superiority.
70. The WRC's emphasis on men's violence towards women is discriminatory, and has the effect of making the man seem to be in the wrong in any instance of violence between a man and a woman.

 

 

DEFAMATION IN GENERAL

 

CEDAW

71. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") outlaws discrimination on the grounds of sex and has been implemented in New Zealand by the passing of the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
72. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") has been ratified by the first defendant.
73. CEDAW defames men by clearly implying that discrimination against women is more common than discrimination against men, althought no attempt is or has been made to inquire into discrimination against men.
74. Since men occupy most of the decision-making positions in the World, CEDAW clearly implies that it is men who are discriminating more against women than against other men.
75. The MWA and UNIFEM refer to CEDAW in some of their website or other publications and the MWA publishes reports on New Zealand's compliance with it.
76. These reports, by implication, defame New Zealand men.

 

 

Domestic Violence

77. The first defendant's policies with regard to domestic violence defame men.
78. Various Crown agencies act in ways in relation to domestic violence, and publish information about domestic violence of a sort, that a reasonable person would be inclined to conclude that domestic violence is solely or principally something that men do to women.
79. It is not the case that domestic violence is solely or principally something that men do to women, as the scientific literature demonstrates overwhelmingly.
80. Crown agencies generally fail to refer to this scientific literature, or do so to a disproportionately limited extent.

 

 

Education

81. The first defendant allows all levels of the education system to be used for the defamation of males.
82. This can reasonably be expected to instill anti-male beliefs in students of all ages.
83. This constitutes defamation by pr0ksy on the part of the first defendant.

 

 

Families Commission

84. The Families Commission ("FC") promotes the defamatory White Ribbon campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Human Rights Commission

85. The Human Rights Commission ("HRC") defames males by supporting the White Ribbon campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
86. The HRC also defames men by treating Domestic Violence in general as if it were just a matter of what men did to women.

 

 

Institute of Judicial Studies

87. The Institute of Judicial Studies, which its Strategic Plan (1998-2001, 4) describes as the continuing education arm of the New Zealand Judiciary, has one representative of the Ministry of Justice on its 9-member Governing Board.
88. The first defendant assisted in setting up the Institute of Judicial Studies and provides the funds that allow the Institute of Judicial Studies to operate.
89. The Institute of Judicial Studies has a Gender Equity Consulting Group, which appears to be involved in the teaching of Feminist theory to members of the Judiciary.
90. Some of the content of this theory defames men.

 

 

Kapiti Coast District Council

91. The Kapiti Coast District Council ("KCDC") has been promoting the defamatory White Ribbon campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

The Kapiti News

92. The Kapiti News is owned by Presspak New Zealand, a division of APN New Zealand Ltd.
93. On 19th November 2008, the Kapiti News ("KN") ran an article headlined "Mayor right behind White Ribbon Day.".
94. White Ribbon Day is part of the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
95. On that day, I telephoned the KN office, and requested equal space to put a Men's Rights viewpoint, but this request was declined.
96. On December 3rd 2008, the KN ran an article headlined "Turning the tide on domestic violence," which also publicised the defamatory White Ribbon Day and gave a sexist, dcscriminatory, and one-sided picture of domestic violence as just being something that men do to women.
97. KN refused to you allow me equal space -- either in interview format or otherwise -- to present a balanced picture about domestic violence, and the harm that is done by pushing an anti-male line.
98. Neither of the two articles published by the KN provided any balance or opposing point of view.

 

 

Kapiti Observer

99. The Kapiti Observer is owned by Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd..
100. On 17th November 2008, the Kapiti Observer ("KO") ran an advertisement from the Kapiti Coast District Council, which included a piece promoting the defamatory White Ribbon Day.
101. White Ribbon Day is part of the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
102. On that day, I telephoned the KO office, and requested equal space to put the true picture, but this was denied to me, on the grounds that this was an advertisement.
103. On November 27th 2008, the Kapiti Observer ran an article headlined "Song celebrates White Ribbon Day," which also gave a one-sided picture of domestic violence as being something that men do to women.
104. The KO refused my request for equal space -- either in interview format or otherwise -- to present a balanced picture about domestic violence, and the harm that is done by pushing an anti-male line.

 

 

The Dominion Post

105. The Dominion Post is owned by Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd..
106. The Dominion Post often publishes articles which give the impression that Domestic Violence is solely or mainly something that men do to women.
107. This is not true.
108. This defames men.
109. Only rarely does The Dominion Post publish statistics which give a truthful, balanced picture of the responsibility of both men and women for Domestic Violence.

 

Kapiti Pak N Save

110. Victory Supermarkets Limited owns the Kapiti Pak N Save supermarket.
111. The Kapiti Pak N Save store has been promoting the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Legal Profession

112. The legal profession has a vital role in the New Zealand Constitution, since it is the means through which the law is upheld and (to some extent) created.
113. The first defendant has a responsibility to ensure that the legal profession operates to facilitate the operation of the Law in conformity with Natural Justice.
114. The first defendant permits and facilitates the indoctrination of members of the legal profession (including judges) in defamatory, anti-male propaganda throughout their careers – in law school and in professional bodies which lawyers belong to.
115. This can reasonably be expected to bias the legal profession against men.
116. Research shows that men are treated more harshly than women by the justice system, and this fact can reasonably be thought to result from the anti-male bias of the legal profession.
117. Female lawyers are allowed to band together in associations such as Women In Law. These associations do not restrict themselves to issues where it has been demonstrated that women fare worse than men in a legal context.
118. These associations bias the atmosphere in which the Law of New Zealand is administered in a way that is defamatory of men, because of the scenario which such associations publicise, which is one in which women are constantly under threat of being disadvantaged by men.

 

 

Ministry of Health

119. The Ministry of Health largely ignores female violence against men and creates an image of family violence as an issue of what men do to women, purely and simply.
120. In so doing, it defames men.

 

 

Ministry of Justice

121. Clause 28 of the Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations 1996 (which are administered in the Ministry of Justice) is, in many respects, an improper and defamatory use of the regulation-making power created by section 127 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 ("DVA").
122. This clause authorises an indoctrination of adult protected persons in an anti-male and unevidenced theory of Domestic Violence which is not authorised by the DVA.
123. Goals (a), (b), and (c) of clause 28 use the words educating, informing, understanding, and awareness in a context which implies that programme providers have scientific, ideological, religious, or even mystical knowledge about the nature, effects, and social, cultural and historical context of domestic violence.
124. No grounds are stated for the apparent belief that there is unanimity about these issues, or who or what is the font of wisdom on these issues.
125. In practice, it is ascertainable from readily available sources of information that the only people who feel that they have certain knowledge about these issues are Feminists who believe in the Duluth or "Power and Control" model of domestic violence.
126. There is no evidence for this model, which emerges from a Lesbian Feminist conviction that men are evil, rather than from scientific analysis of the data.
127. If you search for the phrase "evidence for the Duluth model" or the phrase "evidence for the Power and Control model" on the Web, you get no results, apart from a page discussing the absence of evidence.
128. This unscientific model blames men for domestic violence.
129. Therefore, to the extent that the Regulations promote the teaching of this model, they defame men.
130. There is concrete evidence that this misandry (man-hatred) is taught on these programmes.
131. The Feminist movement was what turned the topic of Domestic Violence into an issue of public and political concern.
132. Feminists consider Domestic Violence to be a "Women's Issue," which appears to mean that the issue should be approached politically, from the point of view of the use that Feminists want to make of the issue, rather than scientifically, as an issue to be looked at rationally and objectively.
133. The evidence in favour of the scientific, as opposed to the Feminist, approach to Domestic Violence is overwhelming, but the point here is that it is a misuse of the DVA to draft regulations that facilitate the dissemination of a particular point of view on Domestic Violence that defames men from the outset, without keeping an open mind as to what the facts might actually show.
134. People are capable of believing almost anything, if it is taught to them in an apparently authoritative setting. Programmes set up under the DVA constitute an authoritative setting which instils defamatory propaganda into people's minds.
135. People who have been taught the Duluth model are likely to have an unfavourable view of activists such as myself, who seek to unseat the Duluth model from its position of influence in society and government.
136. It therefore constitutes indirect defamation of the plaintiff and his fellow activists for the DVA and taxpayer dollars to be used to disseminate the Duluth model.
137. The Ministry of Justice also defames men by not producing any reports on female perpetrators of domestic violence to complement the report "Hitting Home," which reported on male perpetrators of domestic violence.

 

 

Ministry of Social Development

138. The Ministry of Social Development ("MSD") accords a privileged status to the National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges ("Women's Refuge") and to the Chief Executive of the MWA.
139. As explained in paragraphs 176 to 182, the Women's Refuge publishes anti-male information.
140. The MWA also publishes anti-male information.
141. This constitutes defamation of men by pr0ksy.
142. The MSD supports the WRC, , which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Ministry of Women's Affairs

143. The MWA defames men in its publications.

 

 

National Network of Stopping Violence Services

144. The first defendant accords a privileged status to Te Kupenga Whakaoti Mahi Patunga The National Network of Stopping Violence Services (N Z) Incorporated ("NNSVS").
145. NNSVS defames men.
146. This also constitutes defamation of men by pr0ksy on the part of the first defendant.
147. The NNSVS supports the WRC, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

New Zealand Police

148. The New Zealand Police ("the Police") defame men in relation to Domestic Violence, by stating (in some contexts) that Domestic Violence is just a matter of men abusing women, purely and simply.
149. The New Zealand Police ("the Police") also defame men in relation to Domestic Violence, by privileging the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

Paraparaumu Medical Centre

150. In 2008, The plaintiff attempted to persuade the Paraparaumu Medical Centre ("PMC") to take down a poster promoting the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
151. The PMC refused to comply with this request.
152. Eventually, the poster was removed, but the attitude of the PMC is consistent with the possibility that it will reinstate the poster at some time or times of their choosing, as they see fit.
153. The attitude of the PMC appears to be that it will do whatever it feels like doing and is not subject to the Law.
154. The plaintiff has been humiliated by this arrogant and discriminatory attitude on the part of the PMC.

 

 

Rape

155. The term Rape is retained in the Crimes Act 1961, despite the fact that the penalties for Rape are identical with those for Sexual Violation as a whole, of which Rape is the only sub-type mentioned in the Crimes Act 1961.
156. The elements of the offence of Rape are identical with those for Sexual Violation as a whole, except that Rape requires the perpetrator to have and use a penis in the offence.
157. Thus the retention of the offence of Rape is discriminatory and prima facie intended to support the continued existence and activities of anti-male, defamatory organisations such as Rape Crisis, which would lose the ability to focus on male perpetrators and arouse anti-male hysteria to the same extent as they do at present.
158. This nomenclature constitutes defamation of men by pr0ksy.

 

 

State Media Organisations

159. Radio and television obviously have the potential to be very powerful instruments for the dissemination of views held by their owners, operators, or staff – depending on the policies and practices in place within particular radio and television organisations.
160. Feminist activist staff have long used radio and television to disseminate Feminist propaganda and to shut out views which they disagree with.
161. A common feature of this propaganda has been the defamation of men in relation to issues such as domestic violence.
162. The first defendant is guilty of defamation by pr0ksy for allowing this to happen.

 

 

Television New Zealand Ltd.

163. Television New Zealand Ltd. ("TVNZ") has for decades virtually been in partnership with Women's Refuge, having virtually created it in the first place, by means of giving it free publicity.
164. TVNZ has treated Women's Refuge as a sacred cow and has frequently given it free publicity.
165. TVNZ has never criticised or investigated it, nor allowed it to be criticised or to be confronted by its opponents in a televised discussion of any sort.
166. TVNZ has treated Women's Refuge as an expert in Domestic Violence, while denying that status to any Men's Rights organisations, as far as obtaining comment from them on relevant news items for screening is concerned.
167. Since Women's Refuge defames men, this constitutes defamation by pr0ksy on the part of TVNZ.
168. TVNZ also defames men by frequently interviewing other anti-male activists on the topic of Domestic Violence without providing balance by interviewing pro-male activists such as the plaintiff.
169. TVNZ also defames men by interviewing anti-male activists on the topic of Rape without providing balance by interviewing pro-male activists such as the plaintiff.

 

 

The United Nations Development Fund for Women

170. The United Nations Development Fund for Women ("UNIFEM") implies that violence against women is more prevalent than violence against men. This defames men.
171. UNIFEM defames men by supporting CEDAW in its World Wide Web publications, and by implying that men oppress women more than men or women oppress men.
172. UNIFEM's New Zealand website promotes the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

United Nations Secretary-General

173. The United Nations Secretary-General has launched, and continues to run, a so-called "UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign",
174. This campaign is publicised on the World Wide Web.
175. This campaign defames men by implying that violence by men against women is significantly greater or more prevalent than violence by women against men.

 

 

Women's Refuge

176. The first defendant accords a privileged status to the Women's Refuge.
177. Women's Refuge provides services for female alleged victims of male violence and provides anti-male information about Domestic Violence.
178. Women's Refuge states that 42% of its activities are funded by the Government.
179. No men's organisation is funded by the Government to provide services for male victims of female violence or to provide anti-female information about Domestic Violence.
180. The Women's Refuge also has a privileged status within the Ministry of Social Development in relation to Domestic Violence policy.
181. Women's Refuge defames men on its website.
182. This also constitutes defamation of men by the first defendant by pr0ksy.

 

 

DISCRIMINATION IN GENERAL

 

Assault by a Male on a Female

183. Section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 is headed: Assault on a child, or by a male on a female. The Maximum penalty for this offence is 2 years' imprisonment, whereas Common Assault (section 196) carries a maximum penalty of just 1 year's imprisonment.
184. This clearly discriminates against men, because, if a woman assaults a man (without any aggravating circumstances) she does not run the risk of as great a penalty as does a man who assaults a woman (without any aggravating circumstances).
185. By allowing section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 to remain in force, the first defendant discriminates against men.

 

 

Cabinet Office

186. Cabinet Office Circular CO (02) 2 lays down that a gender implications statement is required for all (original emphasis) papers submitted to the Cabinet Social Equity Committee (which is now called the Social Policy Committee).
187. Circular CO (02) 2 states "The purpose of the gender implications statement is to ensure that policy proposals include an assessment of the impact of proposed and existing policies and programmes on women and men, and whether they advantage or disadvantage women and men."
188. Despite this gender-neutral statement of its purpose, the specifics of this document – to the extent that they single out one sex -- clearly focus on the needs of women, rather than those of men.
189. Circular CO (02) 2 lays down a central role for the Ministry of Women's Affairs in the process of producing gender implications statements.
190. Circular CO (02) 2 states " The Ministry of Women's Affairs will review the effectiveness of the gender implications statement."
191. It also states " The Ministry will continue to advise public service departments on how to integrate gender analysis into their policy development, including providing guidance to departments on how to decide on the nature and extent of analysis required for any particular policy issue. The Ministry will also provide one-on-one guidance, seminars and presentations, and will participate in officials groups. Public service departments are, however, ultimately responsible for incorporating gender analysis into their policy development."
192. Since public service departments are advised on the nature of "gender analysis" by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, that Ministry's understanding of what "gender analysis" means is crucial to any understanding of how gender analysis is carried out in practice.
193. There is evidence which makes it clear that "gender analysis" is just about assisting women, as far as the Ministry of Women's Affairs is concerned.
194. In addition, the Ministry of Women's Affairs has no expertise as regards assessing the impact of policy on men.
195. The process of producing gender implications statements therefore lacks any credible means of ensuring that policy does not impact negatively on men.
196. Moreover, the Ministry of Women's Affairs actively promotes the welfare of women, irrespective of how it impacts on men.
197. The Ministry of Women's Affairs both provides policy advice on issues specific to New Zealand women, and aims to improve the lives of New Zealand women.
198. The plaintiff will provide evidence that the Ministry of Women's Affairs used to claim that its goals included "equity" and "no discrimination," but that it has abandoned those claims.
199. There is a clear conflict of interest between representing one section of society and representing the principles of "gender equity".
200. Therefore, having the Ministry of Women's Affairs in the role that it has in the process of producing gender implications statements must tend to encourage the formation of policy that advantages women at the expense of men.
201. In addition, there is no evidence of any expertise as regards assessing the impact of policy on men in any other Government department or agency.

 

 

Circumcision

202. The first defendant discriminates against males by allowing female circumcision to be illegal under sections 204A and 204B of the Crimes Act 1961, while allowing male circumcision to be legal.

 

 

CEDAW

203. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") has been ratified by the Crown.
204. CEDAW discriminates against men by focussing on discrimination against women, despite the fact that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") already outlaws sex discrimination and has been implemented in New Zealand by the passing of the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
205. This neglect of the rights of men is both a result and a cause of preferential treatment for women and discrimination against men.

 

 

Crown Law Office

206. The Crown Law Office – together with the Ministry of Justice – has the responsibility of advising the Attorney-General on the consistency of all Bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA").
207. The plaintiff submits that the Crown Law Office has never advised that any Bill was inconsistent with BORA for the reason that it discriminated against males.
208. The plaintiff submits that the Crown Law Office has never advised that any Bill was inconsistent with BORA, for any reason, where the overwhelming majority of people adversely affected by that Bill were males.
209. The plaintiff submits that the Crown Law Office, in the case of Bills where the issue of discrimination against males obviously might have been raised, has invariably argued that this discrimination was a reasonable limit on the right to be free from discrimination, which limit was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society – under section 5 of BORA.
210. The plaintiff submits that this failure to find any cases of illegal direct or indirect indiscrimination against males in Bills is itself a case of discrimination and a systemic failure of the Crown Law Office and of the Government generally, and is not based on a real lack of such discrimination in Bills.

 

 

Day-to-Day Care of Children

211. The first defendant has instituted a Family Court regime which, upon divorce or separation of the parents, allocates day-to-day care of children more often to women than to men.

 

 

Domestic Violence

212. The Domestic Violence Act 1995 provides that a person may apply for a protection order, in order to prevent some other person (now or formerly living with them) from coming near them or communicating with them.
213. Protection orders can be imposed without the other person knowing that a court was even considering the matter. This type of application for a protection order is called an ex parte application.
214. Moreover, subsections 13(2) and 14(5) state that, in all applications for protection orders, the judge must take into account the perception of the applicant or a child of the applicant's family, or both, of the nature and seriousness of the respondent's behaviour; and the effect of that behaviour on the applicant or a child of the applicant's family, or both.
215. Section 13 applies to Ex Parte Protection Orders, but there is also a smilar section which applies to ordinary (on notice) Protection Orders.
216. Not only can a penalty be imposed on someone in their absence, but they can be penalised for the effect of their behaviour on someone else and for the perception that someone (apart from the judge) has of their behaviour -- neither of which the latter person can fully control.
217. Some -- maybe many -- people would say that the effect of someone's behaviour on someone else is something that the law should be concerned with -- even if that effect is not totally under the control of the former person.
218. However, since the Act mentions the effect of someone's behaviour, why should it also mention someone's perception of someone else's behaviour, which is also not under the second person's full control?
219. Most people who apply for protection orders are female, so what is really involved here is the law's concern for female subjectivity.
220. Section 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 reads as follows:

Liberty of the person -- Everyone has the right not to
be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

221. Does the Domestic Violence Act breach this section? There are two issues: Does the Domestic Violence Act provide for people to be arrested or detained, and, if so, can they be arrested or detained arbitrarily, under the Domestic Violence Act ?
222. The initial effect of a Protection Order is not to arrest or detain the respondent.
223. However, section 49 of the Domestic Violence Act provides for "imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding $5,000" (or imprisonment for up to 2 years for certain categories of repeat offenders) for failing to comply with the terms of an Protection Order or of a direction to attend a programme.
224. So, if, in a particular case, a Protection Order has been imposed, and the respondent subsequently receives a prison term under section 49 of the Domestic Violence Act, the plaintiff considers that that person has been detained in terms of section 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
225. The next question is whether there is scope for the arbitrary imposition of a Protection Order under the Domestic Violence Act.
226. Courts routinely have to determine what the objective facts of a case are.
227. In criminal cases, courts also routinely have to determine what was going on in the mind of the alleged perpetrator at the time of the alleged crime, in relation to any mens rea elements of the alleged offence in question.
228. That is reasonable, since a person (with certain exceptions) has control over his acts and can reasonably be held to account for his own mental attitude.
229. But to be subject to a court sanction -- which may be converted into a fine or imprisonment if one does not comply with its terms -- because of what goes on in the mind of another person is such an unreasonable assault on the inherent dignity of the individual, I submit, that even the third Reich, that icon of crimes against humanity, did not go so far in its inhumanity to man.
230. This provision is, therefore, certainly arbitrary, in my opinion.
231. Therefore, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 breaches section 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
232. Most people who apply for protection orders are female, and most respondents are male, so this constitues indirect discrimination against men.
233. The first defendant is responsible for the existence and contents of the DVA.
234. In addition, the first defendant does not give the same encouragement or opportunity to men as to women to access Domestic Violence victim support services.
235. This throws men back on their own resources.
236. This probably results in men retaliating to female Domestic Violence and an increase and escalation in Domestic Violence.
237. This escalated Domestic Violence is then pointed to as men's fault, whereas it is the first defendant's fault.

 

 

Education

238. The first defendant allows all levels of the education system to be used for anti-male discrimination.
239. This can reasonably be expected to instill anti-male beliefs in students of all ages.
240. The Ministry of Education causes or allows males to achieve less well than females in the education system. This constitutes discrimination against males.
241. The Ministry of Education causes or allows a pro-female, anti-male atmosphere to prevail in the education system. This constitutes discrimination against males.
242. In addition, this pro-female, anti-male atmosphere is bound to have a detrimental effect on the success of male students.
243. This pro-female, anti-male atmosphere is, in part, inculcated amongst teachers by teacher unions. This is bound to affect the style and content of teacher interactions with each other and with students and parents.
244. This pro-female, anti-male atmosphere is also inculcated by the teaching of overtly Feminist courses – not only under the heading "Women's Studies", but also within many other departments and faculties.

 

Employment

245. Where the first defendant has ever investigated employment issues from the point of view of one sex, rather than the other, it has always been from the point of view of women.
246. This is discriminatory in itself, and it should not be an onus on the plaintiff to show in what ways men have employment needs, rights and interests which are distinct from those of women.
247. The plaintiff has not been given the same time, financial and personnel resources by the first defendant to investigate employment issues from the point of view of men that have been given to pro-women groups and agencies to investigate employment from the point of view of women.
248. It is clear that the first defendant has simply assumed that men do not have such needs, rights or interests, but that is a discriminatory and irrational assumption.
249. In addition, the first defendant permits employment double standards which discriminate against men in the New Zealand Police.
250. It is common for Feminists to argue that females need more than just equality with men. They argue that they need equity, which means an adjustment to compensate for some ways in which men and women differ from each other.
251. Similarly, Masculists could argue for equity in policy areas where equality between males and females would leave males worse off.
252. Income is arguably one such area.
253. Many women routinely demonstrate sexual attraction towards wealthy men, whereas it is not common for men to demonstrate sexual attraction towards wealthy women.
254. This means that wealth and income are more important for a man than for a woman. A man with a low income or little wealth has less chance of attracting a woman that he desires than does a high-income or wealthy man.
255. Therefore, the first defendant discriminates against men by pursuing a policy of equal pay for equal work. Men should, in equity, receive more pay than women for the same work.

 

 

False Allegations

256. In practice, there is no recourse for males when they are accused by females of committing an offence against of a sexual or violent nature and the complaint does not result in a conviction – either because no prosecution ensues, or because the court does not decide on a verdict of guilty.
257. The rationale for this state of affairs is apparently that it would have a chilling effect on complaints if complainants were prosecuted for making false allegations.
258. However, it is the case that complainants are sometimes prosecuted for wasting police time.
259. There seems to be no reason why a prosecution for wasting police time would have any less of a chilling effect than a civil or criminal prosecution initiated by the person who was complained about.
260. This regime, in effect, discriminates against victims of false complaints, who are mainly male, in favour of the police and in favour of complainants, who are mainly female.
261. The first defendant is responsible for this indirect discrimination against males.

 

 

Families Commission

262. The Families Commission promotes the discriminatory White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Human Rights Commission

263. The HRC discriminates against males by supporting the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
264. The HRC also discriminates against males by usually treating Domestic Violence in general as if it were just a matter of what men did to women.

 

 

Institute of Judicial Studies

265. The Institute of Judicial Studies, which its Strategic Plan (1998-2001, 4) describes as the continuing education arm of the New Zealand Judiciary, has one representative of the Ministry of Justice on its 9-member Governing Board.
266. The first defendant is also responsible for the funding and continued existence of the Institute of Judicial Studies.
267. The Institute of Judicial Studies has a Gender Equity Consulting Group, which appears to be involved in the teaching of Feminist theory to members of the Judiciary.
268. This is unconstitutional, since Feminist theory has no constitutional status, and this practice undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
269. This practice necessarily discriminates on the basis of sex, because Feminist theory expresses the perceived self-interest of women, and the perceived self-interest of women must necessarily, in some or all respects, conflict with the perceived self-interest of men -- in court cases, as elsewhere in society.
270. This practice necessarily also discriminates on the basis of political opinion, because it disadvantages those in society who may not agree with Feminist theory, but may be a party to a court action..
271. The Institute of Judicial Studies has also refused, in a letter dated 2 June 2006, to supply me with copies of reading materials and transcripts presented to judicial officers on the topic of Gender Equity.
272. The Institute of Judicial Studies, which its Strategic Plan (1998-2001, 4) describes as the continuing education arm of the New Zealand Judiciary, has a Gender Equity Consulting Group, which appears to be involved in the teaching of Feminist theory to members of the Judiciary.
273. This is unconstitutional, since Feminist theory has no constitutional status, and this practice undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
274. This practice necessarily discriminates on the basis of sex, because Feminist theory expresses the perceived self-interest of women, and the perceived self-interest of women must necessarily, in some or all respects, conflict with the perceived self-interest of men -- in court cases, as elsewhere in society.
275. This practice necessarily also discriminates on the basis of political opinion, because it disadvantages thos in society who may not agree with Feminist theory, but may be a party to a court action..
276. The Institute of Judicial Studies has also refused, in a letter dated 2 June 2006, to supply me with copies of reading materials and transcripts presented to judicial officers on the topic of Gender Equity.

 

 

Justice System

277. Women are treated more leniently than men in the justice system, as can be demonstrated statistically.

 

 

Kapiti Coast District Council

278. The Kapiti Coast District Council ("KCDC") has been promoting the White Ribbon campaign White Ribbon Day is part of the White Ribbon Campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Legal Profession

279. The legal profession has a vital role in the New Zealand Constitution, since it is the means through which the law is upheld and (to some extent) created.
280. The first defendant has a responsibility to ensure that the legal profession operates to facilitate the operation of the Law in conformity with Natural Justice.
281. The first defendant permits and facilitates the indoctrination of members of the legal profession (including judges) in discriminatory, anti-male propaganda throughout their careers – from law school onwards.
282. This can reasonably be expected to bias the legal profession against men.
283. In fact, men are treated more harshly than women by the justice system, and this fact can reasonably be thought to result from the anti-male bias of the legal profession.

 

 

Ministry of Health

284. The Ministry of Health largely ignores female violence against men and creates an image of family violence as an issue of what men do to women, purely and simply.
285. In this manner, the first defendant discriminates against men.
286. The first defendant discriminates against men in the Health system, by allowing specialisation in Women's Health, but not in Men's Health. For example, Otago University has a Department of Women's and Children's Health, but it has no Department of Men's Health.
287. The MWA webpage http://www.mwa.govt.nz/women-in-nz (last accessed on 10 November 2009) states as follows:

Life expectancy at birth for women is 81 years, compared with 76 years for men.
288. Despite this fact, the Ministry of Health has no programmes in place to target men's health or increase men's life expectancy, but has programmes in place which target women's health and, in effect, target women's life expectancy.
289. This demonstrates a discriminatory attitude, where women are treasured and men are regarded as expendable.

 

 

Ministry of Justice

290. The Ministry of Justice – together with the Crown Law Office – has the responsibility of advising the Attorney-General on the consistency of all Bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA).
291. The plaintiff submits that the Ministry of Justice has never advised that any Bill was inconsistent with BORA for the reason that it discriminated against males.
292. The plaintiff submits that the Ministry of Justice has never advised that any Bill was inconsistent with BORA, for any reason, where the overwhelming majority of people adversely affected by that Bill were males.
293. The plaintiff submits that the Ministry of Justice, in the case of Bills where the issue of discrimination against males obviously might have been raised, has invariably argued that this discrimination was a reasonable limit on the right to be free from discrimination, which limit was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society – under section 5 of BORA.
294. The plaintiff submits that this failure to find any cases of illegal direct or indirect indiscrimination against males in Bills is itself a case of discrimination and a systemic failure of the Ministry of Justice and of the Government generally, and is not based on a real lack of such discrimination in Bills.
295. The notion of balance (as in the symbol of a female figure holding scales) is inherent in the notion of justice.
296. The notion of Natural Justice, in the sense of audi alteram partem, in the sense of the balance symbolised by the scales of justice, is almost totally absent, where issues which pit the interests of women against those of men are concerned.
297. The Ministry of Justice has no concern for justice, in that sense, when it draws up proposals for changes in many aspects of the law where the interests of women and men conflict.
298. It is interested, to a large extent, in furthering the perceived interests of women at the expense of those of men.
299. Almost without exception, the Ministry of Justice takes an anti-male approach when proposing law reforms that involve areas of the law where the interests of men and women conflict.
300. The Ministry of Justice appears to adhere to an ideology, whereby women are known in advance to be disadvantaged, relative to men, which renders the need to consult with anyone apart from women's groups a mere empty formality, since their views will be ignored, where issues which pit the interests of women against those of men are concerned.
301. Clause 28 of the Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations 1996 (which are administered in the Ministry of Justice) is, in many respects, an improper and discriminatory use of the regulation-making power created by section 127 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 ("DVA").
302. This clause authorises an indoctrination of adult protected persons in an anti-male and unevidenced theory of Domestic Violence (the Duluth model) which is not authorised by the DVA.
303. This unscientific model blames men for domestic violence.
304. Therefore, to the extent that the Regulations promote the teaching of this model, they discriminate against men.
305. There is evidence that this misandry (man-hatred) is taught on these programmes.
306. The Feminist movement was what turned the topic of Domestic Violence into an issue of public and political concern.
307. Feminists consider Domestic Violence to be a "Women's Issue," which appears to mean that the issue should be approached politically, from the point of view of the use that Feminists want to make of the issue, rather than scientifically, as an issue to be looked at rationally and objectively.
308. The evidence in favour of the scientific, as opposed to the Feminist, approach to Domestic Violence is overwhelming, but the point here is that it is a misuse of the DVA to draft regulations that facilitate the dissemination of a particular point of view on Domestic Violence that discriminates against men from the outset, without keeping an open mind as to what the facts might actually show.
309. The plaintiff has spent a considerable amount of effort, time and emotional energy on combatting the Duluth model in New Zealand and internationally.
310. The plaintiff has met with considerable harassment and discrimination on a regular basis from people who believe in the Duluth model.
311. People are capable of believing almost anything, if it is taught to them in an apparently authoritative setting. Programmes set up under the DVA constitute an authoritative setting which instils man-hating propaganda into people's minds.
312. It therefore constitutes direct discrimination against the plaintiff and his fellow activists for the DVA and taxpayer dollars to be used to disseminate the Duluth model.
313. The Ministry of Justice also discriminates against men by not producing any reports on female perpetrators of domestic violence to complement the report "Hitting Home," which reported on male perpetrators of domestic violence.

 

 

Ministry of Social Development

314. The MSD accords a privileged status to the Women's Refuge and to the Chief Executive of the MWA.
315. As explained in paragraphs 176 to 182, Women's Refuge is a defamatory, anti-male organisation.
316. As explained in paragraphs 320 to 334, the MWA is a discriminatory, anti-male organisation.
317. The MSD does not accord a privileged status to any pro-male organisations.
318. This constitutes discrimination against men.
319. The MSD supports the WRC, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.

 

 

Ministry of Women's Affairs

320. The Ministry of Women's Affairs is a branch of the Executive that discriminates against men and Masculists.
321. The very existence of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, in the absence of a corresponding Ministry of Men's Affairs, is a discriminary lie, in that it amounts to a claim that women in New Zealand need more help combatting discrimination than men do, whereas that fact has never been demonstrated by rational or reasonable process, and is clearly untrue.
322. A prima facie case can easily be made out that men in New Zealand need as much help as women do in combatting discrimination, or more help than women do in combatting discrimination.
323. If the first defendant allocated as many resources to the task as they currently do to proving the opposite, then it could be conclusively proven that men in New Zealand need as much help as women do in combatting discrimination, or more help than women do in combatting discrimination.
324. The Ministry of Women's Affairs provides policy advice on issues specific to New Zealand women.
325. The Ministry of Women's Affairs aims to improve the lives of New Zealand women.
326. The Ministry of Women's Affairs used to claim that its goals included "equity" and "no discrimination," but it has largely abandoned those claims, although they are still present in older documents.
327. In any case, the plaintiff submits that it is not rational to belief that a Ministry which represents one section of society (i.e. women) is capable of simultaneously representing the principles of "equity" and "no discrimination with respect to the rest of the population (i.e. men).
328. There is a clear conflict of interest between representing one section of society and representing the principles of "equity" and "no discrimination with respect to the rest of the population.
329. What is particularly insidious about this is the fact that Government funding allows Feminists in the Ministry of Women's Affairs to spend time and resources exploring ways in which women might plausibly be depicted as being disadvantaged.
330. This allows the Ministry of Women's Affairs to select certain issues and ignore other issues.
331. This also allows the Ministry of Women's Affairs to be much better equipped to make and support policy proposals than are Masculists to oppose them or put forward others.
332. The Ministry of Women's Affairs has always selected issues where women can be made out to be disadvantaged, and ignored issues where men can be made out to be disadvantaged.
333. In addition, issues have always been framed in ways which present the best case for considering women to be disadvantaged.
334. The Ministry of Women's Affairs has a conflict of interest in this regard, because any inability on its part to come up with areas where women are disadvantaged would likely increase the calls for the Ministry of Women's Affairs to be abolished.

 

 

National Network of Stopping Violence Services

335. The first defendant accords a privileged status to the NNSVS.
336. NNSVS defames men.
337. The first defendant accords no privileged status to pro-male organisations.
338. This constitutes discrimination against men.

 

 

New Zealand Police

339. The New Zealand Police ("the Police") discriminate against men in relation to Domestic Violence, by stating (in some contexts) that Domestic Violence is just a matter of men abusing women, purely and simply.
340. The Police also discriminate against men in relation to Domestic Violence, by privileging the White Ribbon campaign, which is described in paragraphs 52 to 70.
341. Section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 is headed: Assault on a child, or by a male on a female. The Maximum penalty for this offence is 2 years' imprisonment, whereas Common Assault (section 196) carries a maximum penalty of just 1 year.'s imprisonment.
342. This clearly discriminates against men, because, if a woman assaults a man (without any aggravating circumstances) she does not run the risk of as great a penalty as does a man who assaults a woman (without any aggravating circumstances).
343. Because the Police exercise their discretion so as to enforce section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961, the Police discriminates against men.
344. The Police have lower physical standards for female recruits than for male recruits, which discriminates against men.
345. The Police has these lower standards in order to increase the number of female police officers.
346. The Police desires to increase the number of female police officers so that the Police are reflective of New Zealand Society in general.
347. The Police claim that they do not know who decided, or when it was decided that the Police should be reflective of New Zealand Society in general.
348. The Police claims that the policy that the New Zealand Police should be reflective of New Zealand Society in general is "common sense" and "an acknowledgement that Police exist in a diverse society."
349. The Police are saying that they see increasing the number of women in the police as a desirable goal in itself.
350. Their only reason for this is that they want the police to be reflective of New Zealand society as a whole.
351. I am not aware that any other body is required to be "reflective of society as a whole", or that Parliament has laid this down as a general goal.
352. This "goal" appears to have been invented by the New Zealand Police and/or the Labour Party.
353. The Police could just as reasonably say that they need to be reflective of the criminal population, for example.
354. Then the Police would have to be mostly male and have to have many more Maoris and other Polynesians officers than they have at present.
355. To say that the Police need to be reflective of society as a whole is arbitrary.
356. It is just intended to give jobs to women and to deny them to men.
357. This policy discriminates against male applicants who miss out on selection because they can only meet the female standards, but not the male standards.
358. If the standards are there to ensure that the police are physically competent, then female police officers are likely to be physically incompetent.
359. This means that the public is not being protected by a competent police force, and the first defendant is in breach of its duty to provide law and order for the benefit of all law-abiding New Zealanders.
360. The Police have avoided answering the question as to why they do not have, or plan to have different standards for entry for blind people, deaf people, paraplegics, various ethnic groups (e.g. Samoans and East Asians), or transvestites.
361. Not only are men been discriminated against, in comparison with women, but all these groups are being discriminated against as well.
362. The Police do not have separate standards for people of different cultures, faiths, disabilities or sexualities -- just for women.

 

 

Parenthood

363. Women always know that a child they give birth to is their own – unless assisted reproduction has been employed.
364. On the other hand, men cannot be so certain that the child born to their female partner is their genetic offspring.
365. As a result of those facts, men's needs and interests in relation to procreation differ from those of women.
366. Where women's needs are greater than men's, women's pressure groups (including the MWA and the HRC) tend to argue successfully for a change in the law, under the heading of so-called "gender equity."
367. One area where this sort of argument has been made, for example, is pregnancy.
368. Since men have a right to know whether the child they are supporting and devoting time, effort and affection to is genetically their own, the first defendant should be – but is not – supporting this right in legislation.
369. However, the first defendant is not doing that.

 

 

Radio New Zealand

370. Radio New Zealand regularly disseminates one-sided anti-male propaganda in its news programmes, and does not give both sides of such issues.
371. The Broadcasting Act allows no redress against such systematic and repeated discrimination.

 

 

Rape

372. The term Rape is retained in the Crimes Act 1961, despite the fact that the penalties for Rape are identical with those for Sexual Violation as a whole, of which Rape is the only sub-type mentioned in the Crimes Act 1961.
373. The elements of the offence of Rape are identical with those for Sexual Violation as a whole, except that Rape requires the perpetrator to have and use a penis in the offence.
374. Thus the retention of the offence of Rape is discriminatory and prima facie intended to support the continued existence and activities of anti-male organisations such as Rape Crisis, which would lose the ability to focus on male perpetrators and arouse anti-male hysteria to the same extent as they do at present.
375. This discriminates against men.

 

 

Reproductive Rights and Child-Support

376. The Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977 makes no provision for fathers to participate in the decision as to whether an abortion should take place.
377. In addition, a female may deceive a male as to her contraceptive status – e.g. as to whether she is regularly taking a contraceptive pill.
378. In both those situations, a male may involuntarily become a father and subject to legal obligations in respect of the child, with whom he may not even have any right of contact.
379. Obligations for fathers exist by virtue of the Child Support Act 1991.
380. Conversely, in both those situations, a male may wish to become a father but he has no right to translate his wish into reality.
381. In other words, a man has no reproductive rights, being subject to the whims of a woman, although the man has equal liabilities with respect to any child who is born.

 

 

Right to Vote and Military Service

382. The right to vote is accorded to women without relieving men of the extra responsibilities which went with the right to vote prior to that time.
383. For example, under the Emergency Regulations Act 1939 and the National Service Emergency Regulations 1940, only men were conscripted to serve in the second World War, although women voted for the Governments which were in power when these measures were enacted.
384. There is every reason to think that every male still has the threat hanging over his head that, depending only on his age, health and type of employment at the relevant time, he will be subject to conscription in a similar emergency.
385. The fact that women are allowed to serve in the front line of the armed forces at the moment is not counter-evidence to the plaintiff's contention that the threat of conscription hangs over the heads of males only, since women being allowed to serve in the front line has come about under the heading of "women's rights," and the concept of "women's responsibilities" has never been mentioned in that connection by the first defendant.

 

Sexist Language

386. The first, tenth and eleventh defendants discriminate systematically against males as regards sexist language.
387. Terms intended to refer to both men and women which are banned for being allegedly sexist consist solely of terms which allegedly discriminate against women, such as chairman, whereas terms which arguably discriminate against men, such as boy racer, manhunt and gunman, are not banned.

 

 

Sexual Violation

388. The offence of Sexual Violation in the Crimes Act 1961 is discriminatory, in that it does not take into account the fact that the role of initiator in heterosexual sexual activity is socially imposed on the male, on the whole.
389. The offence of Sexual Violation in the Crimes Act 1961 imposes the risk of severe penalties on the initiator, but does not impose any risks on the non-initiator.
390. Unless it were to be claimed that non-initiators never desire sexual activity, the Crimes Act 1961 creates a scenario where non-initiators, who are usually female, exploit initiators, who are usually male.
391. This discriminatory scenario is maintained in place by the first defendant.

 

 

Sports Equality

392. The first defendant discriminates both against men and against disabled, youthful and veteran sports participants by allowing women to participate in separate sports events from men, instead of allowing men and women to compete against each other.
393. Despite allowing women to participate in separate and obviously second-rate competitions, the first defendant allows winners in female-only competitions to have equal status with winners in male-only competitions – for example, in the Olympic Games, in which New Zealand participates.
394. The first defendant does not allows winners in disabled-only, youth-only, or veteran-only competitions to have equal status with winners in male-only competitions.
395. This discrimination is allowed to occur even when the sports involved are professional ones.
396. Where employment is concerned, there is no area where men are allowed to perform to a lower standard and still receive the same benefits as women who perform at a higher level.

 

 

State Media Organisations

397. Radio and television obviously have the potential to be very powerful instruments for the dissemination of views held by their owners, operators, or staff – depending on the policies and practices in place within particular radio and television organisations.
398. Feminist activist staff have long used radio and television to disseminate Feminist propaganda and to shut out views which they disagree with.
399. A common feature of this propaganda has been discrimination against men in relation to information on men's issues and women's issues.
400. The first defendant himself has often been subjected to this sort of discrimination.
401. The first defendant has failed to put in place a regime to prevent this sort of systematic discrimination.

 

 

Television New Zealand

402. Television New Zealand ("TVNZ") has for decades virtually been in partnership with Women's Refuge, having virtually created in the first place, by means of giving it free publicity and credibility with the public at large.
403. TVNZ has treated Women's Refuge as a sacred cow and has frequently given it free publicity.
404. TVNZ has never criticised or investigated it, nor allowed it to be criticised or to be confronted by its opponents in a televised discussion of any sort.
405. TVNZ has treated Women's Refuge as an expert in Domestic Violence, while denying that status to any Men's Rights organisations, as far as obtaining comment from them on relevant news items for screening is concerned.
406. This practice discriminates against men.

 

 

Welfare and Best Interests of the Child Principle

407. Section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 states that the welfare and best interests of the child must be the first and paramount consideration in the administration and application of that Act, and in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or contact with, a child.
408. This provision discriminates against the rights and interests of other people involved in the relevant circumstances – typically, the parents of the child.
409. Inasmuch as day-to-day care is more frequently granted to mothers than to fathers, the Care of Children Act 2004 constitutes indirect discrimination against men, since it is clear that the welfare and best interests of the child is more often being interpreted in a way that benefits mothers than in a way that benefits fathers.
410. Furthermore, Section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 cannot possibly be interpreted in a rational manner, since it is not humanly possible to know and anticipate – let alone weigh up – all the factors which might possibly be relevant to the welfare and best interests of the child from that point in his life onwards.
411. That indeterminacy makes it relatively easy to camouflage bias against fathers.
412. The first defendant is responsible for the welfare and best interests of the child having the status that it has in the Care of Children Act 2004.
413. The first defendant is also responsible for the fact that day-to-day care is more frequently granted to mothers than to fathers.

 

 

Women's Refuge

414. The first defendant accords a privileged status to the Women's Refuge.
415. Women's Refuge provides services for female alleged victims of male violence and provides anti-male information about Domestic Violence.
416. Women's Refuge states that 42% of its activities are funded by the Government.
417. No men's organisation is funded by the Government to provide services for male victims of female violence or to provide anti-female information about Domestic Violence.
418. The Women's Refuge also has a privileged status within the Ministry of Social Development in relation to Domestic Violence policy.
419. All this constitutes discrimination against men, which is subsidised and supported by the first defendant.

 

 

CONCLUSION

420. The gravity, extent and scale of the offences committed by the first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants, in particular, are an order of magnitude greater than any other outside the criminal realm of crimes against humanity or genocide.
421. The first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants have brought about de facto constitutional change by stealth.
422. Without any appropriate public debate, constitutional decision-making process, or even fully rational thought having taken place, the first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants have de facto enshrined the precepts of perpetual female disadvantage and perpetual male advantage into the New Zealand Constitution.
423. The first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants have acted as if the fact that women might be seen as having been disadvantaged by men in the past guarantees that they are disadvantaged by men in the present and that they will be disadvantaged by men into the indefinite future.
424. The first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants have acted as if the fact that women might be seen as having been disadvantaged by men in the past guarantees that men were not disadvantaged, relative to women, in the past, that they are not disadvantaged, relative to women, in the present, and that they will not be disadvantaged, relative to women, into the indefinite future.
425. Therefore, the remedies applied for against the first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants should also be of an order of magnitude greater than any other outside the realm of crimes against humanity or genocide.
426. The plaintiff applies for aggravated damages because of the oppression he has endured at the hands of people who have quite clearly believed the anti-male propaganda disseminated by the Defendants, and who therefore were offended by the plaintiff's attitude to the issues involved.
427. The plaintiff applies for aggravated damages also because of the oppression that men in New Zealand have endured at the hands of people who have quite clearly believed the anti-male propaganda disseminated by the Defendants, and who therefore have rushed to take an anti-male line in a host of circumstances.
428. Naturally, it would be impractical to try to prove exactly who had been influenced by exactly which source of propaganda.
429. One aggravating feature of the offences committed by the first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth defendants is their behaving as if authorised by some Constitutional enactment to consistently prefer the rights and interests of women over those of men, when no such Constitutional enactment exists in fact.
430. The plaintiff seeks exemplary damages against some Defendants because their actions constituted oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional attacks on the rights and interests of men.
431. Those Defendants which are organs of the Crown are in the position of a fiduciary in relation to male citizens of New Zealand, which forms another reason for exemplary damages.
432. Other governments must be taught not to indulge in such irrational oppression of one sector of their populations, which forms a 3rd reason for exemplary damages.
433. The plaintiff applies for these remedies in good faith, being fully cognizant of the fact that the Court, if it finds these remedies excessive, may penalise the plaintiff.


Wherefore the plaintiff claims:

DAMAGES FOR DEFAMATION
• damages for defamation of $50,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff by each of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth defendants.



AGGRAVED DAMAGES FOR DEFAMATION
• aggravated damages for defamation of $50,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff by each of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth defendants.


EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR DEFAMATION
• exemplary damages for defamation of $50,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff by each of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth defendants.


"BAIGENT" DAMAGES FOR DISCRIMINATION
• damages for discrimination of $100,000.00 each to be paid to the plaintiff by the first, second, fourth, fifth, tenth, and eleventh defendants.


AGGRAVATED DAMAGES FOR DISCRIMINATION
• aggravated damages for discrimination of $100,000.00 each to be paid to the plaintiff by the first, second, fourth, fifth, tenth, and eleventh defendants.


EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR DISCRIMINATION
• exemplary damages for discrimination of $100,000.00 each to be paid to the plaintiff by the first, second, fourth, fifth, tenth, and eleventh defendants.


OTHER ORDERS

• an order instructing the first defendant to apologise formally and publicly to the males of New Zealand for the systematic defamation and discrimination to which they have been subjected.
• an order instructing the first defendant to abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs within 3 months of the judgment in this matter.
• an order instructing the first defendant within 3 months of the judgment in this matter (a) to set up a Men's Affairs Trust with the plaintiff and anyone he may at any time nominate as Trustees, (b) to deposit into that Trust's bank account a sum equal to the total of all the capital and operating budgets of the Ministry of Women's Affairs since that Ministry was established, and (c) to set up a reasonable and effective audit mechanism to ensure that the balance in the Trust's bank account and the interest earned by investing the fund are applied only to the costs of Men's Rights projects, including but not limited to such items as salaries, travel, conferences, publications, lobbying, advertisements and litigation.
• an order instructing the first defendant to deposit into the Men's Affairs Trust bank account mentioned above a sum equal to the total of all the monies ever given by the Crown to the Women's Refuge, NNSVS and Rape Crisis – apart from those originating in the proceeds of lotteries -- within 3 months of the judgment in this matter.
• an order by the Court that the first defendant institute within 3 months of the judgment in this matter a Royal Commission of Inquiry ("the Inquiry") into the breaches of the Bill of Rights Act found by the Court in this proceeding.
• an order by the Court that the first defendant undertake to implement any findings of the Inquiry which substantially replicate the findings of the Court in this proceeding.
• an order by the Court that the first, second, third, fifth, eighth, ninth, fourteenth and sixteenth defendants cease to promote, advertise, fund or otherwise assist the White Ribbon campaign.
• an order by the Court that the third, fifteenth and sixteenth defendants cease to state or imply in any way that violence by men against women is in any significant way more serious or more prevalent than violence by women against men.
• an order by the Court that the fourth defendant remove any mention of Gender Equity from its internal structures and processes.
• an order by the Court that the sixth and seventh defendants shall never give coverage to Domestic Violence issues in their respective publications in a way which states or implies that men's violence towards women is more serious or more prevalent than women's violence towards men unless the sixth or seventh defendant, as the case may be, cites a wide range of views and a wide range of research on the matter in that coverage.
• an order by the Court that the tenth and eleventh defendants shall never give coverage to Domestic Violence issues in their respective news and current affairs programmes in a way which states or implies that men's violence towards women is more serious or more prevalent than women's violence towards men unless the tenth or eleventh defendant, as the case may be, cites a wide range of views and a wide range of research on the matter in that coverage.
• an order by the Court that the twelfth and thirteenth defendants cease to imply that violence against women is more prevalent or more serious than violence against men and cease to imply that men oppress women more than men or women oppress men in any electronic or other publication in New Zealand.
• an order by the Court that the fourteenth defendant cease all of its activities which affect New Zealand with immediate effect, including the dissemination of information on the Internet which can be perceived in New Zealand.

 

COSTS

• that each party's costs in this matter should be borne by that party itself.

 

Dated this day of 2009.

...........................................................................

Peter Zohrab

 

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